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3

ARGUMENTS
I.

APPORTIONMENT OF MEDICAL EXPENSES IS PROPER
UNDER UTAH LAW AND IS ALREADY PERMISSIBLE IN THE
OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE ACT

Ms. Edmonds argues in her brief that apportionment of medical expenses would
not work in a case where no TTD or PPD payments were awarded. Specifically, Ms.
Edmonds argues
Here there wasn't any disability (not TTD or PPD) and only medical benefits are
due ... If compensation under Section 110 were to mean medical benefits as well
as disability benefits, then apportionment under this section would be impossible
to apply when there is no disability or death, but only medical expenses, because
the apportionment formula as worded specifically requires apportionment based
upon a comparison of work and non-work related disability, making no mention of
what medical care is related to the industrial injury or aggravation. (Appellee
Brief, Page 9).
Ms. Edmonds' reading of Utah Code Ann. §34A-3-110 is inconsistent when the
benefits would be subject to causative apportionment, but the medical benefits would not
be apportioned. Given this example, if TTD or PPD benefits were awarded they would
be apportioned according to the 10% causative apportionment in this case, but medical
benefits would be paid at 100% despite causative apportionment. This reading of the
statute is inconsistent with the intent of the Legislature to only have the employer be
responsible for their portion of the occupational disease caused by the employer.
Otherwise, the employer is the general insurer of the petitioner's non-industrial
conditions.
To give meaning to the Legislature's directive with causative apportionment as
found in Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-110 and spelled out in 34A-3-105, the applicable
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statutes should be read to allow for apportionment of medical benefits. Otherwise, this
Court's longstanding policy of avoiding coverage for conditions not caused or
exacerbated by industrial factors would go by the wayside and the employer would be left
paying for the employee's non-industrial medical expenses.
In essence, Ms. Edmonds is arguing that she is entitled to have her Carpal Tunnel
Syndrome covered 100% by her employer even though Ameritech was found to have
contributed only 10% to her non-industrial conditions.

Under Allen v. Industrial

Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986), the Supreme Court has ruled the employer should
not be made to be the general insurer of an employees underlying, non-industrial
conditions. If the Commission's decision holds true, this does not comply with the
mandate laid out in Allen and shifts the burden of Ms. Edmonds' non-industrial
conditions over to the employer.
In order for consistent application of the causative apportionment principles found
in § 110, causative apportionment must be applied to medical benefits along with other
benefits received by Ms. Edmonds.

The Legislature did not abandon the causative

apportionment found in § 110 and § 105. Ms. Edmonds essentially argues that regardless
of causative apportionment between industrial and non-industrial factors, medical
benefits should be paid at 100% regardless of industrial exposure. This is inconsistent
with the Industrial Accident Chapter, and inconsistent with the Occupational Disease
Chapter's insistence of causative apportionment in §§ 105 and 110.
As for Industrial Accidents, Utah Courts generally have recognized the nature of
the traumatic injury that aggravates a non-industrial, pre-existing condition. Specifically,
5

in Giesbrecht v. Board of Review of State Indus. Comm'n, 828 P.2d 544 (Utah Ct. App.
1992), the Utah Court of Appeals provided the following:
Utah law recognizes the aggravation rule such that where an industrial injury
aggravates, accelerates, or combines with a preexisting condition, the entire
resulting injury is compensable so long as the claimant can show that the
employment contributed something substantial to increase the risk he already
faced in everyday life because of his condition.
Giesbrecht 828 P.2d at 547 (quotations omitted) (emphasis added).
This is the long-standing rule in traumatic industrial injuries. Under this analysis
for occupational disease claims, Ms. Edmonds' medical benefits would be wholly denied
as she has failed in her burden of proof given Ameritech's 10% causative apportionment
as found by the Commission. Ms. Edmonds would have had to show the employer's
causative contribution exceeded 10% to show that it substantially increased the risk she
already experienced in her day-to-day life given the 90% causative contribution attributed
thereto.
Given the differing nature of traumatic injuries versus long-standing occupational
exposures, it is appropriate to apportion medical benefits based upon causative
contribution. Otherwise, it would be inappropriate to require a substantial showing of
causation to cover a non-industrial condition for traumatic injuries in Chapter 2, but then
allow 100% coverage of medical benefits in the event the employer is found to have
contributed even 1% towards the underlying condition.

Apportionment of medical

benefits would reconcile these inconsistencies or adopting a similar rule with respect to
occupational diseases would reconcile the inconsistencies of Ms. Edmonds' position on
appeal.
6

Because the Legislature enacted the Utah Occupational Disease Act with causative
apportionment principles as the mode of recovery, this Court should allow causative
apportionment to medical benefits.

Otherwise, this Court would allow the burden-

shifting Ms. Edmonds seeks for her non-industrial conditions and would make the
employer a general insurer of an employee's pre-existing condition.
II.

APPORTIONMENT OF MEDICAL EXPENSES WOULD NOT BE
CONTRARY TO MS. EDMONDS' EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS

The underlying argument for differing treatment under the equal protection law is
the nature of the injuries. Without taking into account the nature of the injuries, Ms.
Edmonds' arguments for equal protection ring hollow. Ms. Edmonds treats occupational
exposures and traumatic injuries the same, despite the fact the nature of the injuries are
different and require differing treatment.
With a traumatic industrial injury, you have an identifiable accident or series of
activities that lead to an injured back or other body part that is identifiable and concrete.
From this you would be able to apportion between what is industrial and non-industrial
under a series of tests under Allen to determine whether it was more likely than not, both
legally and medically, that the injuries were caused by industrial factors.

Given the

nature of the traumatic injury, the Commission would also have to apply the exacerbation
principles, as discussed in Giesbrecht to the injury to determine whether the employer
was responsible for the intertwined pre-existing conditions and traumatic industrial
injury.
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With occupational diseases, there is a difference in the nature of the injury where
the employee, as in this case, has numerous non-industrial factors that are causing the
majority of the person's alleged disability. The question then changes from whether it
was more likely than not that her injuries were related to industrial factors, to a question
regarding the percentage of the injury caused by industrial factors. The problem arises
out of the nature of the injury in general, where industrial factors and non-industrial
factors are closely intertwined and must be determined on a percentage basis. Given the
nature of the exposure, be it chemical or physical, there is such a difference as to allow
for the disparate treatment between the two Chapters.
In one example, because there is a back condition or a leg condition or some other
condition where the courts have ruled that if the industrial factors ;lit up' the condition,
the employer was responsible for the entirety of the injury and related benefits. In the
occupational disease case, the difference is that industrial and non-industrial are
intertwined to a degree that is not easily determined or separated and is separated on a
percentage basis.
As for a rational basis for allowing the treatments of two groups of injured
workers to differ, the petitioner does not take into account the nature of the injuries and
attempts to lump all injured parties into the same categories. The differences between the
two groups are apparent when dealing with occupational exposures.
An example is someone with asthma who is exposed to a chemical.

The

underlying condition is apparent, but there has been some exposure to the harmful
chemical that has caused the condition to worsen, which would depend on the level of
8

exposure. The employee is tested and medical opinion provides that her condition has
slightly worsened and so she is found to have a 65% pre-existing condition with only
35% related to industrial factors.

The only way to measure her industrial injury is

through a percentage basis as she already had underlying conditions that had similar
symptoms to her industrial exposure.
This example is far different than an employee with degenerative disc disease in
her low back and who suffers an injury to her back as a result of lifting a heavy object. If
the employee had ruptured a disc in her low back there can be no percentage
apportionment, except in permanent partial disability, because the injury is definable and
definite. In recognition of this problem, Utah Courts have determined that if the accident
iit up' or more than likely caused the condition to worsen, the underlying condition
along with the industrial condition would be covered.
Again, the nature of the injury mandates that if the underlying condition was
exacerbated by industrial factors, there is no way to separate the injury to the body part
and the employer is left to cover the industrially caused injury. As long as the industrial
injury substantially caused the need for additional treatment or surgery, the non-industrial
and industrial conditions are covered by the employer.
In occupational disease cases, however, there must be a separation of underlying
conditions and industrial conditions on a percentage basis because oftentimes one is
looking at an exposure that is not easily definable. For instance, looking at the facts of
the instant case, the medical panel and ALJ both determined that Ms. Edmonds'
occupational exposure amounted to 10% of her overall problem. Her overall problem
9

had been defined as carpal tunnel syndrome caused by over-utilization of her hands in
everyday life or for non-industrial activities was found to be 90% of the problem in her
hands and wrists. This fact has not been appealed or challenged by Ms. Edmonds.
The difference between the two examples is one of a long exposure that has been
mixed with numerous non-industrial exposures, such as in the instant case, and a
traumatic exposure that has turned a condition symptomatic. The differences between a
long-term exposure and traumatic exposure should be treated differently due to their
natures and their effect on the human body.
If Ms. Edmonds' opinion is allowed to stand, she could have any carpal tunnel
surgery, which ranges in cost up to $10,000, covered by her employer even if her
employer was only 1 % responsible on a causative basis for her condition. If this were a
case of traumatic injury, none of the conditions would be covered as the Commission
would have to find the underlying condition was more likely than not exacerbated by the
traumatic industrial injury.
The legislature recognized this dichotomy between injuries and the fundamental
differences in the types of injuries by allowing apportionment between industrial and
non-industrial factors for injuries.

Utah Code Ann. §34A-3-110.

Similarly, the

Legislature has already allowed the split of benefits between employers on a percentage
basis.

Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-105.

This Court, as a result, should allow the

apportionment of medical benefits as it is already allowed pursuant to statute. If the
Court does not allow apportionment, the petitioner will have been allowed to shift the
entirety of her non-industrial/pre-existing burden onto the employer.
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In the alternative, the Court should adopt the reasoning of Giesbrecht to determine
whether the industrial conditions substantially caused the need for surgery. If this principal is
applied to the instant case, benefits must be denied as the Commission found that only 10% of
Ms. Edmonds' condition was related to industrial factors. This solution would allow for equal
application of the law between Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. Ameritech, however, believes that
apportionment is allowed and consistent with the nature of the injury. Given the differing nature
of the injuries related to Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, Ameritech believes that apportionment of
medical expenses would not violate Ms. Edmonds5 equal protection rights.
In sum, employers should be allowed to apportion medical benefits

in

occupational disease cases pursuant to the language in Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-110,
which already is allowed in 34A-3-105. In the alternative, this Court should apply the
test in Giesbrecht, or similar test, if it rules that apportionment is not permissible with medical
benefits.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Ameritech respectfully request this Court overturn the
Labor Commission Order On Motion for Review and allow Ameritech to apportion its
liability for Ms. Edmonds' medical benefits based upon its percentage of liability. In the
alternative, this Court should reconcile the case law regarding industrial accidents to case
law regarding occupational disease claims. This would avoid the inconsistent outcome of
an employer paying for 100% of the industrial and non-industrial medical benefits when
the employer is found only to be 10% at fault.
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